


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- I. As a result of army defections on the island of Sumatra, the Indonesian Government now faces both the threat of civil war and the danger of a resumption of Communist influence on a more serious scale than at any time since 1948.
 - A. The immediate military problem is in North Sumatra, where the colorful local military commander, Col. Simbolon, seized the provincial government at Medan and severed relations with the central government on 22 December.
 - Simbolon, in turn, was deposed on 27 December by Lt.
 Colonel Ginting, an officer loyal to the central government.
 - 2. Simbolon, who escaped from Medan, has been given until



- B Simbolon, at last reports, has reached the town of Tarutung In his home district of Tapanuli (on the Indian Ocean coast). At least 18 months ago Simbolon erected barracks and ammunition dumps in Tapanuli, where he is the 'favorite sun' of some million Christian Bataks. Tarutung is H.Q. of the Third Regiment, which has declared for Simbolon, as has the First Regiment (at Kwtaradja, in the north).
 - 1. Of the 13,000 troops in North Sumatra, about half are now believed loyal to Simbolon, while the other half are presently supporting Ginting.
- II. Earlier, in Central Sumatra, a local army commander (Lt. Col. Hussein) subordinate to Simbolon assumed control of the provincial government on 20 December, claiming dissatisfaction

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 A. Hussein, who commands 10,000 troops, has stated that he

 was forced 'to take the helm into his own hands' because

 the central government no longer considered the "wishes

 and aspirations" of the central Sumatra people.
- B. At present, there appears to be a close connection between Hussein and Simbolon.
- C. Another dissident army officer, former Chief of Staff
 Lubis -- who attempted a coup against the Ali government

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in mid-Movember

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joined Simbolon on North Sumatra.

III. Finally, the civilian governor of South Sumatra, on 24 December, blocked further transfer of funds and revenues normally flowing to Djakarta. Although the governor claims his action is aimed

at accelerating needed development and reconstruction in his Approved For Release 2002/02/12 CIA-RDP79R00890A000800030002-4 province, and had nothing to do with "politics and provincial-ism," there is a possibility of complicity with Simbolon. The military commander in South Sumatra, with 10,000 troops, appears to be cooperating with the civilian governor.

- IV In this situation, the problem facing the central government is three-fold.
 - A. First is a direct threat to survival of the Ali cabinet.
 - 1. The disaffected army elements in both North and Central Sumatra have called for the cabinet's resignation and a return to leadership of former vice president Hatta, himself a Sumatran.
 - 2. President Sukarno, Prime Minister Ali and his National Party, however, are reported determined to preserve

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

CHANGED TO:

VEXT REVIEW DATE:

I. Soviet influence in Afghanistan has continued to grow through out 1956.

- A. In the economic aid field, more than a dozen development projects are now under way, financed by a Soviet credit of \$100 million, granted in 1955.
 - 1. Heavy use of the Soviet transit route for Afghan foreign trade shipments has continued.
- B. Throughout 1956, small shipments of Soviet arms have arrived.

 In the past two-and-a-half months, however, these arms shipments have been stepped up.
- II. The extent of this Soviet arms build-up is not completely clear, but a beefing-up of the antiquated Afghan Air Force appears to

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to 17 jet fighters (either MIG-15s or 17s) arrived in Mazar1-Sharif at the end of October, while 36 to 48 piston
trainers (including YAK-12s, YAK-18s, and even a few helicopters) were flown from the USSR to Kabul about the same

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III. The Soviets are also undertaking both airfield construction and personnel training for the Afghan air force.

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35 Soviet technicians

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are present at Mazar-i-Sharif for supervision of work on a

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- Absorption of these Soviet arms will take some time but the Approved For Release 2002/02/12: CIA-RDP/9R00890A000800030002-4

 Afghan build-up--particularly the air build-up--has serious implications.
 - A. First, it represents Soviet penetration into a new and strategic sector of Afghan national affairs—the military—on which the power of the Afghan government rests to a considerable degree.
 - B. Second, an up-to-date Afghan air force—which should become effective in a few years—would to all intents be a Soviet—controlled weapon in South Asia.
 - 1. For example, the Soviets could benefit from Afghan reconnaissance flights over strategic Pakistani installations (including those of interest to the US).

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- C. Perhaps the greatest and most immediate danger is that the Approved to the control velocity and the classic states and most immediate danger is that the Approved to the control velocity and the classic states are control to the approximation of the approxima
 - 1. In the same fashion, the Afghans, stimulated by the mere possession of this new equipment, might be unable to resist the temptation to make hostile moves against Pakistan.
 - 2. This temptation would be particularly strong with regard to the Pushtoonistan border area, long in dispute between the two countries.
 - 3. Heretofore, Pakistan's great advantage in this dispute has been uncontested control of the air over Pushtoonistan.

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BACKGROUND -- STATUS OF ROYAL AFGHAN AIR FORCE

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I. On 1 August 1956 (before receipt of Boviet aid) the Afghan Air Force had the following composition:

A. Aircraft Strength:

Fighters (piston) 12 (6 Hawker Hind, 6 Alfa Romeo) Transport-Bombers 11 (Avro Anson)

Transport-Rombers 11 (Avro Anson)
Trainer (piston) 4 (Tiger Noths)

TOTAL 27 (only about 50% operational)

B. Disposition: All aircraft stationed at Kabul.

C. Personnel Strength:

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(none jet-trained: only 6 considered competent in existing equipment)

All others (officers and men) 56

TOTAL 91

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1. Average flying timecof pilots: less than two hours a month.

